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An apology is the superglue of life. It can repair just about anything.  
(Lynn Johnston, Canadian Cartoonist) 
1.  Introduction 
Apologies are remarkable. After an offense they restore social order without amending 
the offense. No material has been exchanged, yet the relationship between harmdoer and 
harmed p arty  has  improved ( Tavuchis  (1991)).  Apologies  can  enhance  many  kinds  of 
economic and social relationships that are upset. They are used in everyday life between 
individuals, between co-workers and business partners. Apologies can influence the outcome 
of elections and accelerate peace negotiations. Since people are part of several networks of 
relations,  apologies  are  omnipresent.  But  why  do  apologies  work?  They  cannot  undo  the 
offense and they cannot repair the caused damage either. Nevertheless an apology can help to 
reveal the intention behind the preceding offense. After an offense, a victim usually does not 
know  whether  the  harmdoer  is  a  friendly  person  who  harmed  accidently  or  whether  the 
harmdoer intended to harm. However, the victim’s punishment decision strongly depends on 
the offender’s type. Punishment for intentional offenses is higher than for accidental harm. An 
apology is an offender’s chance to inform the victim about his type. This information can of 
course be a lie or the truth. Since there is experimental evidence that people have a preference 
for telling the truth, it is quite feasible that an apologizer is less likely to be an intentional 
harmdoer than a non-apologizer. Is this the reason why apologies work?  
To answer this question we use a laboratory experiment and create an environment 
where people can economically harm others and where apologies for offenses are appropriate 
and  reasonable.  We  control  for  clearly  intentional  offenses  and  offenses  with  ambiguous 
intentionality  which  in  our  design  can  have  two  reasons:  either  they  are  committed 
intentionally or due to inability. The novelty of our design is that the offender is always 
responsible  for  the  offense  but  did  not  necessarily  commit  the  offense  intentionally.  The 
design also allows the offender to write a message after harming. Our study is the first that not 
only analyzes the victims’ reactions to apologies but also focuses on the offenders’ motives 
for sending an apology. We therefore do not restrict messages to ready-made output but let 
participants write individual messages. We are interested in the kind of messages offenders 
will write and whether apologies naturally occur.  
We  find  that  an  apology  is  in  fact  the  most  common  message  after  an  offense. 
Harmdoers apologize for their offense – even if the apology is costly. However, in contrast to 
the quote at the beginning, an apology does not ‘repair just about anything’. We find that   3 
apologies do not ‘glue’ at all after clearly intentionally committed offenses. On the contrary, 
after such offenses harmdoers do better not to apologize since sending an apology in this 
situation strongly increases punishment compared to just remaining silent. In situations where 
the intention behind the offense is ambiguous, apologies are a very powerful instrument: 
Harmdoers who apologize are punished less often than harmdoers who remain quiet. Victims 
seem  to  expect  those  responsible  for  the  offense  to  sincerely  apologize.  Missing  the 
opportunity to apologize seems to worsen the offense and therefore increases punishment 
probability. Victims seem to trust that an apology is more than the attempt to get around 
trouble or punishment. Our results show that this assumption is naïve. We find that offenders 
primarily apologize if they fear punishment for the offense. Evidently it is not remorse that 
makes a harmdoer apologize but the hope to prevent punishment. Nevertheless, apologies 
work.  Harmdoers  who  apologize  are  punished  with  lower  probability.  However,  if  the 
apology does not prevent punishment from taking place, it will not mitigate the degree of the 
punishment either. Our data suggest that people do not partly forgive. They either accept the 
apology  and  therefore  do  not  punish,  or  they  do  not  accept  the  apology  and  punish 
nevertheless.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next session summarizes related 
literature. Section 3 introduces the experimental design. Section 4 gives predictions. Section 5 
presents the results and Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Related Literature 
Our  paper  is  related  to  studies  analyzing  behavior  after  apologies  for  actually 
experienced and economically relevant offenses (Ohtsubo and Watanabe (2009), Ho (2007), 
Skarlicki et al. (2004), Schweitzer et al. (2006), Bottom et al. (2002), Abeler et al. (2009)). 
Our contribution is the distinction between intentionally committed offenses and offenses 
with ambiguous intentionality. We are the first to analyze how an apology affects punishment. 
Our study is also the first one that analyzes offenders’ motives for sending an apology. 
In psychology there is a large body of evidence that a harmdoer who sends an apology 
is  much  more  likely  to  be  forgiven  than a   non-apologizer.  Most  of  these  studies  can  be 
grouped into three categories. In the first category psychologists present vignettes describing 
situations in which an offender did or did not apologize. Participants then make judgments 
about the offender (See for example Ohbuchi and Sato (1994), Weiner et al. (1991), Girard et 
al.  (2002),  Ohtsubo  and  Watanabe  (2009),  Wada  (1998),  Scher  and  Darley  (1997)).  The 
second category includes studies where participants have to remember past self-experienced 
situations. They are told to recall whether the offender did or did not apologize and to give   4 
explanations  of  how  they  felt  in  this  particular  situation  and  whether  they  accepted  the 
apology. (See for example Exline et al. (2007), McCullough et al. (1997), McCullough et al. 
(1998), Schmitt et al. (2004).) The third category uses deceptive role-play with actual offenses 
(Ohbuchi et al. (1989), Struthers et al. (2008)). All three categories document that apologies 
have a mitigating effect on anger and increase forgiveness.  
Apologies are most effective when they are sufficiently long and come across as sincere 
(Darby and Schlenker (1989), Shapiro (1991), Skarlicki et al. (2004)), include an expression 
of responsibility (Scher and Darley (1997), Struthers et al. (2008)), an expression of remorse 
(Gold and Weiner (2000), Tavuchis (1991), Darby and Schlenker (1989)) and explanations in 
the form of excuses rather than justifications (Shaw et al. (2003)). It is not clear yet how 
offers  of  compensation  affect  forgiveness.  On  the  one  hand,  several  studies  show  that 
compensation payments can increase forgiveness (Bottom et al. (2002), Schmitt et al. (2004), 
Scher and Darley (1997), Witvliet et al. (2002), Zechmeister and Romero (2002)). On the 
other  hand,  Abeler  et  al.  (2009)  find  that  customers  who  receive  an  apology  instead  of 
monetary  compensation  forgive  significantly  more  often.  The  authors  conduct  a  field 
experiment  with  three  different  treatments:  An  apology  treatment,  where  the  customer 
receives an email including an apology and a high and a low compensation treatment. The 
authors argue that getting paid money could reduce the intrinsic motivation of customers to 
forgive (as in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)) and that an apology might trigger a heuristic to 
forgive that is hard to overcome rationally. In opposition to this reasoning are the results by 
Struthers et al. (2008), Skarlicki et al. (2004) and Bennett and Earwaker (1994). They show 
that  an  apology  does  not  trigger  a  heuristic  to  forgive  but  that  its  mitigating  effect  on 
punishment  crucially  depends  on  the  characteristics  of  the  offense.  The  literature  thereby 
clearly distinguishes between responsibility and intentionality of the harm. In a vignette study 
Bennett  and  Earwaker  (1994)  analyze  whether  the  offender’s  responsibility  affects  the 
acceptance of an apology. They find that the higher the responsibility for the harm, the lower 
the acceptance of the apology. In Struthers et al. (2008) forgiveness was less likely following 
an apology when offenders intentionally committed an offense. Skarlicki et al. (2004) present 
very similar results. In their study receivers of unfair offers in an ultimatum game accept these 
offers less often after an apology than after no message was sent. Since in this case an unfair 
offer is always made intentionally, these results show that after intentionally committed harm 
an  apology  can  backfire  and  even  increase  punishment.  Those  who  apologize  for  an 
intentionally  committed  harm  may  be  perceived a s  s e l f -interested,  untrustworthy,  and  as 
having  an  ulterior  motive  (Fein  (1996),  Schul  et  al.  (2004)).  This  might  lead  to  lower   5 
acceptance rates. Ohbuchi and Sato (1994) conduct experiments with children and find this 
effect also with fifth graders. The children accepted a harmdoer’s apology only when they 
believed that the harm was committed unintentionally. Interestingly, second graders were not 
sensitive to the harmdoer’s intent.  
Ohtsubo and Watanabe (2009) and Ho (2007) introduce theoretical models predicting 
that receivers of an apology are sensitive to the cost involved in the apology. Experimental 
evidence is ambiguous. Ohtsubo and Watanabe (2009) find their hypotheses confirmed. In 
their  experiment  participants  in  the  costly  apology  condition  abstained  from  sending  a 
complaint  message  to  their  offender  after  an  apology.  In  the  repeated  trust  game  by  Ho 
(2007),  costs  do  not  affect  the  event  of  forgiveness,  which  is  measured  by  the  amount 
entrusted in the following period. 
An apology’s effect on reputation has been analyzed in Schweitzer et al. (2006) and 
Bottom et al. (2002). Schweitzer et al. (2006) use a trust game in order to test how apologies 
can repair trust after an offense within a repeated interaction. Schweitzer et al. (2006) find that 
an apology alone does not facilitate trust recovery. The apology has to come along with a 
promise for future trustworthy behavior. Bottom et al. (2002) conduct a prisoner’s dilemma 
and find that apologies indicating good intentions for the future have a positive effect on trust 
recovery in repeated interactions.  
Apologies also differ with respect to culture and gender. Asians apologize more than 
Americans (Takaku et al. (2001)) and women apologize more than men (Tavuchis (1991), 
page 127). Frantz and Bennigson (2005) find that apologies expressed at a later stage of a 
conflict are more effective than earlier ones, and that this effect is mediated by feeling heard 
and understood. 
In law there is a broad literature on apologies, too. Here the main question of interest is 
whether an apology is a possible mechanism to avoid a law suit. For overviews see Cohen 
(2002) or White (2009). 
3.  Experimental Design and Procedure 
Our basic design is similar to Ho (2007) who uses a trust game with an apology option 
at the end. We use a sequential prisoner’s dilemma with apology option and punishment. 
Additionally we manipulate the mechanism how to cooperate. For cooperation, subjects have 
to correctly answer a question. Defection results, when they answer the question incorrectly. 
This feature allows that defection can be the result of inability or of intentional unkindness. In 
detail, the sequence is the following:   6 
1.  At the beginning of the game both players receive an endowment of 60 points in order 
to avoid negative payoffs throughout the game.  
2.  Player A then receives a multiple choice question.  
If he gives the correct answer, he loses 40 points and his partner player B receives 120 
points. If he answers incorrectly, points do not change.  
3.  Both players learn about player A’s result. Next, player B receives a multiple choice 
question, too. If he answers it correctly, he loses 40 points and player A receives 120 
points. If he answers incorrectly, points do not change. 
Therefore,  if  both  players  answer  their  questions  correctly,  they  receive  80  points 
each.  However,  player  B  maximizes  his  payoff  by  giving  a  wrong  answer  after a  
correct answer by player A.  
4.  The  players  learn  whether  the  answers  were  correct  and  player  B  can  send  an 
individual  message  to  player  A.  We  are  interested i n   whether  offenders  use  the 
message to apologize for their harming.  
5.  Next, player A can deduct points from player B. One deducted point costs player A 
0.2 points. Punishment is restricted such that it cannot yield negative payoffs. 
The questions were easy but not trivial. For example, we asked for the capital of Japan, 
giving Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama and Kyoto as possible answers. By ensuring that not all 
participants could perfectly solve the questions, we induced uncertainty of intentions. Not 
giving the right answer to the question can be chosen intentionally
3 or due to inability. We 
provide a measure for the question’s difficulty and an opportunity for the players to form an 
individual view on the difficulty of their partners’ questions. For that purpose the players 
receive their partners’ multiple choice questions at the same time. If they answer this solo 
question correctly, they receive 5 points. We call the fraction of players who are able to solve 
their partner’s multiple choice question the solvability benchmark. On average participants 
could solve 85% of the questions.
4  
We  run  five  treatments.  The  first  treatment  is  the  control  treatment  (baseline)  as 
explained above. In the second treatment no punishment no punishment is possible. We use 
this treatment to analyze whether offenders still apologize when they do not fear punishment. 
Third, in the treatment costly writing a message costs 5 points. The results of this treatment 
will show whether the decision to apologize depends on costs and whether costly apologies 
                                                 
3 In a laboratory experiment Utikal and Fischbacher (2009) analyze how people attribute intent to helpful and 
harmful actions. They find that when the harming agent is economically strong, people perceive the offense as 
intentional. Therefore we define one possible reason for giving a wrong answer as intent. 
4 We discuss the implications in the results section.   7 
are more credible. In the fourth treatment no apology option, player B cannot send messages. 
We thereby control how people cooperate and punish deviators when no apology is possible. 
The fifth treatment no quiz varies the potential assignment of intentions. In the quiz games a 
wrong answer can be due to intentional harm or due to inability. In no quiz, an offense is 
always  caused  intentionally.  In  this  treatment  we  use  the  same  parameters  as  before. 
However, participants do not have to answer questions. They just decide whether they want to 
give up 40 points in order to cede 120 points to their partner. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
treatments.  
  Baseline  No punishment  Costly  No apology 
option 
No quiz  










Quiz  X  X  X  X   
Apology option  X  X  X    X 
Apology costless  X  X      X 
Punishment  X    X  X  X 
Table 1: Treatments 
The whole procedure was common knowledge. We conducted 12 sessions in the time 
from June to November 2009. All sessions were conducted at the LakeLab (TWI/University 
of Konstanz) with a total number of 356 participants. Before the experiment started, subjects 
were randomly assigned to their role as player A or B. Players kept their role throughout the 
game in order to avoid learning the content of others’ messages. The experiment lasted 10 
rounds. We used a perfect stranger matching in order to avoid repetition effects and to keep 
players A from receiving identical messages. Participants received the income of all periods. 
One point translated into 0.01 euros. The experiment took about 60 minutes, average income 
of participants was 10.93 euros (14.87$) plus a show-up fee of 2 euros (2.72$). The games 
were  programmed  with  z-Tree ( Fischbacher  (2007)).  We  recruited  participants  using  the 
online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner (2004)). Each subject sat at a randomly assigned 
PC terminal and was given a copy of instructions.
5 A set of control questions was provided to 
ensure the understanding of the game. The experiment did not start until all subjects had 
answered all questions correctly. We ensured that no subject participated more than once in 
our experiment. We rule out spillover effects across and within sessions by giving every 
player a different question. 
                                                 
5 A translation of the instructions can be found in the appendix.   8 
4.  Predictions 
What kind of information do people confer when they apologize? The typical apology 
contains a statement of remorse and a statement that the outcome will not occur again in the 
future. A special case of the latter statement is the claim that the outcome was not caused 
intentionally. In this section, we investigate how and why an apology can work. First, we 
present the formalization of the game that players are playing in our experiment. In the second 
part we present theoretical elements that can explain why apologies work, complemented with 
the most important experimental evidence. We integrate these elements into one theoretical 
model. Finally, we characterize the model’s theoretical predictions.  
 
Figure 1: Decision set of player B after player A has correctly answered the question 
Figure 1 shows the subgame starting at Player B’s move after player A has correctly 
answered the question. Note that in contrast to the game theoretical outcome based meaning 
of the expressions “defection” and “cooperation” in the prisoner’s dilemma, we define them 
intention-based. We distinguish between players who want to answer incorrectly (defectors)   9 
and players who want to answer correctly (cooperators). This way, also players who answered 
erroneously incorrectly are cooperators. 
The game tree describes that player B either tries to give the correct answer, i.e., he 
cooperates ( ) or intentionally gives the wrong answer ( ), which means that he defects. 
If he cooperates, he will be able to give the correct answer with probability . If he defects, 
we assume that player B is able to give the wrong answer with certainty. This is plausible 
because the answers were easy and it was even easier to find at least one wrong answer. After 
intentionally  or  unintentionally  giving  the  wrong  answer,  player  B  can  apologize,  which 
means he claims that he wanted to give the correct answer. We will show that if people are 
averse to lying, those who apologize are more likely to have wanted to give the right answer 
than non-apologizers. Therefore, they care more about the other players’ payoff and deserve 
less punishment.  
Of course, the information of whether player B simply does not know the answer or 
answers intentionally incorrectly is private. When receiving an apology after a wrong answer 
by player B, player A does not know whether player B cooperated or defected. Therefore, an 
apology  after  cooperation  (CA)  and  an  apology  after  defection  (DA)  belong  to  the  same 
information  set  of  player  A.  No  apology  after  cooperation  (CN)  and  no  apology  after 
defection (DN) form another information set. We define p as the proportion of cooperators 
who apologize and q as the percentage of defectors who apologize.  
First, we assume selfish preferences and derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
using backward induction. Regardless of what happens, player A does not punish. Therefore, 
player B defects and does not solve the task. Anticipating this player A defects too. Since the 
players’  behavior  does  not  depend  on  the  preceding  behavior  of  the  other  player,  text 
messages cannot have an impact on behavior – neither on punishment nor on the cooperative 
behavior in the knowledge questions.  
Theories that model non-selfish motives based on outcome-oriented preferences like 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) also predict that apologies have no 
impact on behavior. These models assume that people have an additional component in the 
utility function, which captures disutility from inequity. In these models, utility depends not 
only on the own payoff but also on the payoff of the other players. However, utility depends 
only  on  the  final  allocation,  i.e.  it  does  not  depend  on  the  procedure.  This  implies  that 
punishment should only depend on the outcome of the decision, in particular it does not 
depend on the existence or content of the message and, even when known, it would not 
depend on the reason why a player B answered incorrectly.   10 
However,  in  this  paper  we  hypothesize  that  apologies  truthfully  transmit  regret 
concerning an unintentional outcome. Thus, the first two relevant elements for understanding 
apologies are that people are lying averse and also liar-averse. That means that people have a 
preference  for  truth-telling  -  for  themselves  and  also  with  respect  to  others.  These 
assumptions are supported by Hurkens and Kartik (2009), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), 
Lundquist et al. (2009), Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2007) and Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz 
(2009).  The  third  important  assumption  is  that  people  care  about  intentions.  Several 
experiments have shown the importance of intentions (Blount (1995), Charness and Levine 
(2007), Brandts and Sola (2001), Falk et al. (2003), Falk et al. (2008)) and in response to this 
evidence,  theories  have  been  developed  that  take  intentions  into  account.  Two  main 
approaches in the modeling of intentions can be distinguished. In theories based on Rabin 
(1993), intentions are inferred with respect to which choice was made in comparison to the 
possible alternatives. In such a model, a purposeful wrong answer by player B would be 
considered as intentionally unkind because in expected terms, it was the most harmful action 
player B could take. On the other hand, an erroneously wrong action was not planned to harm 
player A and was the best action that was available to B. However, the intention cannot be 
observed.  When  B  wants  to  cooperate  but  fails  the  same  outcome  results  as  when  B 
intentionally gives the wrong answer.  
Levine (1998) takes a different approach to model intentions but we will show that also 
in  his  model,  planned  wrong  answers  are  considered  as  less  kind  than  unplanned  wrong 
answers. In the model of Levine, players differ in their concern for the other players’ payoffs. 
The value of this concern for player i is defined as  .
6 Furthermore, ceteris paribus, 
players reward those with a high positive other regarding concern and punish those with a 
low, negative other regarding concern. This reciprocity parameter is denoted as . The 
model of Levine values the other players’ payoffs with a weight of . 
Since  the  Levine  model  allows  for  player  types  we  will  use  his  model  to  incorporate 
intentions  and  complement  it  with  lying  and  liar  aversion  in  the  following  way.  First,  if 
people lie themselves, they experience a disutility . Second, if they believe that the other 
person  lies  with  probability ,  the  weight  of  the  other  player’s  payoff  is  reduced  to 
,  where    is  the  liar  aversion  of  player  i.  In  the 
following, we analyze the game based on this model. Here apologies can have an impact 
when players have preferences as assumed in the extended Levine model.  
                                                 
6 This restriction is assumed by Levine (1998). However, it is irrelevant for our results.   11 
Note  that  pooling  equilibria  in  which  all  players  apologize  or  no  player  apologizes 
cannot be excluded in the general case – even when we additionally restrict equilibria to 
satisfy  the  intuitive  criterion.  Furthermore,  we  note  that  multiple  equilibria  can  exist. 
Nevertheless, some general characteristics of the equilibria can be shown. Let us focus on 
those players B who answered the question incorrectly in the case when apologies matter, i.e. 
in a separating equilibrium in which punishment differs between those who apologize and 
those who do not. We will show that in this case those who apologize for their offense have 
on average a higher value of than those who do not apologize. Therefore they deserve less 
punishment, which justifies that they apologize. An apology is credible when lying aversion is 
sufficiently large to prevent some defectors from apologizing. Such a separating equilibrium 
does not always exist. Nevertheless, the following proposition holds. 
Proposition Assume that players are risk neutral and have a utility function as in the modified 
Levine  model  outlined  above.  As  in  the  Levine  model,  we  assume  that  the  reciprocity 
parameter   is common knowledge. Further, we assume that the other-regarding concern , 
the lying aversion   and the liar aversion   are private knowledge. Finally, we assume that 
the distributions are continuous, common knowledge, and that , , and are independent. 
Furthermore, . Then for any perfect equilibrium the following properties hold. 
a) In the quiz games ( ) with punishment and apology option, there is either a 
pooling equilibrium or punishment is at most as high after an apology than after no apology, 
i.e. .  
b) Assume . If player B cooperates and was nevertheless unable to answer 
correctly, he will apologize, i.e. .  
c) Assume . On average, players who apologize have an that is at least 
as high as that of players who do not apologize. 
d) When all players have a strictly positive lying aversion , then at least as many 
players apologize in the punishment condition as in the no punishment condition.  
e) If   (no quiz treatment), punishment is at least as high after an apology than after 
no apology. Thus . 
Proof of the Proposition 
a) If punishment was higher after an apology, no one would apologize and a pooling 
equilibrium results.    12 
b) If punishment is lower after an apology, all players apologize when apologizing is 
sufficiently cheap. Since it is costless for those who cooperate, they apologize. 
c)  Let  be  the  critical  value  that  makes  defecting  players  indifferent  between 
apologizing and not apologizing. First, we characterize the players who defect and do not 
apologize. These players have a  with  , where !  is the difference in payoff after 
apologizing  and  not  apologizing.  Since  cooperation  always  results  in  a  higher  payoff  for 
player A than defection, players who defect have a lower "i than those who cooperate. To be 
precise, there is a critical value "
* below which players with   defect. For "i<"
*, it is 
  (1) 
Players  who  defect  and  apologize  have  a    with  .  Since  lying  aversion  is  only 
relevant after defection, it follows 
         (2) 
      (3) 
       (4) 
        (5) 
  (6) 
This means that players with "i<"
* and   defect and apologize. Thus, the critical "
** for 
all players with  is higher or equal to "
*, i.e.  "
*!"
**. Thus, the group of players who 
do not apologize consists of all players with and "i<"
*, while the group of players who 
apologize consists of all players with  and  "i<"
*, as well as players with "i>"
*. These 
players are the players with   "
*<"i<"
**, and those who cooperate but fail to answer correctly. 
Because #i and $i are independent, this implies that the average "i of the players who do not 
apologize is lower or equal to the average "i of the players who apologize. Finally, because #j, 
and  rij  are  in  equilibrium  independent  of  the  types  and  the  parameters  #j  and  %j  are 
independent, the lower average "i translates into a lower average of #i. 
d) No type of player defects when the punishment option exists and cooperates when 
the punishment option does not exist. Therefore, the share of cooperators is (weakly) higher in 
the punishment condition than in the no punishment condition. Furthermore, all cooperators in 
the  punishment  condition  apologize  and  no  defector  in  the  no  punishment  condition 
apologizes because they have strictly positive lying cost  .    13 
e) Apologies after clearly intentionally committed offenses are lies. If somebody claims 
that he did not commit the offense intentionally, he is truly dishonest. Assuming people are 
liar averse, they will punish such a behavior.  q.e.d. 
We cannot make a prediction concerning the effect of the apology option. Intuitively, 
i.e. ignoring changes in cooperation in response to the apology option, we expect that the 
punishment levels of players who do not have the opportunity to apologize are between the 
punishment levels of players after having received an apology and after no apology. 
Similarly,  there  is  no  unambiguous  effect  when  apologies  are  costly.  Introducing  a 
marginal cost suggests that writing an apology becomes more demanding, fewer defectors as 
well  as  cooperators  apologize.  We  summarize  the  preceding  reasoning  to  the  following 
predictions. 
Prediction 1 Harmdoers who face possible punishment are more likely to apologize than 
harmdoers who do not face possible punishment. 
Prediction 2 In the quiz games apologizers will be punished less than non-apologizers. 
Prediction 3 Offenders without apology option will be punished more than apologizers and 
less than non-apologizers. 
Prediction  4  In  the  no  quiz  game  punishment  is  higher  after  an  apology  than  after  no 
apology.  
5.  Results 
This section is divided into three parts. First, we turn towards behavior in the sequential 
prisoner’s dilemma. Second we present motives for apologies. Third, we focus on the effects 
of apologies on punishment. In the latter two sections we focus on behavior after offenses 
only, namely the situation when player B did not answer correctly although player A did. In 
this situation apologies can occur. 
Results on the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
In this section, we present the results of the prisoner’s dilemma. We first focus on the 
results of the quiz game. In the quiz game treatments participants can cooperate by answering 
a question. Player A’s performance can be interpreted as trust in a correct answer of player B. 
We find that possible punishment significantly improves player A’s performance. Player A’s 
performance does not differ from the baseline when messages are costly. When participants   14 
cannot write apologies player A’s performance decreases. 
Player  B  receives  the  same  question  as  player  A  in  order  to  create  a  solvability 
benchmark. 86% of players B are able to correctly answer the question of player A and 83% 
of  players  A  give  the  right  answer  to  the  question  of  player  B.  This  difference  is  not 
significant which means that the questions have the same level of difficulty.
7 As Figure 2 
shows,  player  A’s  performance  is  significantly  below  this  solvability  benchmark  in  all 
treatments. The results of the related regression are presented in Table 4 (column 1). 
 
Figure 2: Performance in quiz games 
Let us now turn to player B. Figure 2 indicates that player B can find himself in two 
different situations. Player A might or might not have answered the question correctly. If 
player A answered correctly, a following correct answer by Player B can be interpreted as 
trustworthiness.  We  find  that  player  B’s  performance  is  always  below  the  solvability 
benchmark. When A answered correctly in the baseline treatment 68% of players B answer 
correctly,  too.  Without  the  punishment  threat  player  B’s  performance  significantly  drops 
down to 42%. Performance in the costly message treatment is 71% and does not vary from the 
baseline  treatment.  When  participants  do  not  have  the  option  to  apologize,  performance 
significantly decreases to 59%.
8 The results of the related regression are presented in Table 4 
(column 2). 
When A did not answer correctly 15% of players B answer correctly in the baseline 
treatment. When no apology is possible this share slightly increases. We do not find that the 
other treatments have an effect on performance. Player B’s performance strongly depends on 
                                                 
7 Probit regression with standard errors clustered on session: p>0.1 
8 This result is in line with findings by Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) who show that cooperation increases 
with anticipated feedback.   15 
player A’s behavior. This means that a correct answer by player A significantly increases the 
share of correct answers by player B.
9 Conditional cooperation is therefore very strong. Table 
3 (column 3) shows the results of the corresponding regressions. 
We do not find that behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma depends on the way the dilemma 
is implemented. There are no significant differences between the quiz games and the no quiz 
game..
10  
Motives for apologies 
    Treatments   
Category  Example  Baseline 
no 




Frequency of offense    0.25  0.32  0.23  0.18   
Number of offenses    98  80  84  44   
No message    0.27  0.76  0.51  0.52   
Apology:  
Admission of blame-
worthiness and regret 
I am sorry. I thought 
the answer was…  0.33  0.09  0.28  0.11 
 
Apology & other    0.08    0.03  0.04   
Admission of blame-
worthiness (without 
admission of regret) 
I thought the answer 
was…  0.05      0.05 
 
Blameworthiness & other    0.02      0.09   
Admission of regret 
(without admission of 
blameworthiness)  I am sorry.  0.07  0.08  0.04  0.09 
 
Other    0.17  0.08  0.14  0.09   
Table 2: Percentage of message categories after offense with apology option 
In all treatments except in the treatment no apology option, player B was endowed with 
an individual message option. In order to analyze the written messages 19 additional subjects  
were recruited to independently sort messages into at least one of the 5 following categories: 
admission of blameworthiness, admission of regret, request for mercy (Please do not punish 
me), small talk (jokes, etc), and invitation to punish (Please punish me). In case of disunity 
between  the  raters,  we  applied  the  majority  rule.  Messages  were  only  sorted  into  one 
particular category when the majority of raters decided to do so
11. For the analysis we define 
an apology according to Schlenker and Darby (1981) as an ‘admission of blameworthiness 
                                                 
9 Probit regression with standard errors clustered on session: p<0.01 
10 The only small difference is that slightly fewer players B cooperate after a non-cooperative move of player A 
in the no quiz game (Probit regression with standard errors clustered on session: p<0.1) This result might be 
driven by participants who simply dislike giving a wrong answer and gain some utility from answering correctly. 
11 Following this procedure two messages were taken out of the sample because there was no majority for any 
category.   16 
and regret for an undesirable event’.
12 Due to a small number of observations and for reasons 
of simplicity we combine the categories request for mercy, small talk, and invitation to punish 
into the category other. Table 2 presents the categories’ relative frequencies.  
Against expectations only few harmdoers use the message to explicitly emphasize their 
good intentions. On average only 5% use the expressions ‘unintentional’ or ‘not intentional”. 
A much more common approach for harmdoers is to give a statement of blameworthiness 
indicating why they did not answer correctly. This kind of message can be interpreted as an 
implicit expression of unintentionality.. Although some offenders write pure admissions of 
blameworthiness and pure admissions of regret, the most frequent message after an offense is 
in  fact  an  apology.
13  Therefore  we  will  focus  on  the  motives  and  effects  of  this  kind  of 
message 
Result 1 Harmdoers who face possible punishment are more likely to apologize. 
Table 4 (column 4) shows that the harmdoers’ decision of whether to apologize depends 
on  two  variables:  First,  possible  punishment  significantly  increases  sent  apologies.  In  the 
baseline treatment 41% of offenses are followed by an apology. Without the punishment 9% 
of offenses are followed by an apology. This confirms Prediction 1.  
  Correct answer 
of player A in 
quiz games 
Correct answer 
of player B after 
correct answer by 
A in quiz games 
Correct answer of 
player B after 
wrong answer by A 
in quiz games 
Apology after an 
offense in games 
with apology 
option 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
No punishment  -.085***(.028)  -.145***(.041)  -.055(.045)  -.060***(.010) 
Costly   -.023(.025)  .009(.030)  .030(.048)  -.032***(.012) 
No apology option  -.136*** (.046)  .058**(.027)  .147***(.025)   
No quiz        -.067***(.013) 
Solo question  .097***(.035)  -.229***(.028)  .147***(.034)   
No of observations  3560  2586  974  1235 
Wald "
2  23.67  358.33  880.09  94.50 
Prob>"
2  .0001  .0000  .0000  .0000 
Pseudo R
2  .0286  .0859  .3538  .0411 
Number of clusters  10  10  10  10 
*: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01. 
Table 4: Probit regressions, reporting marginal effects, with robust standard errors, standard 
errors in parentheses clustered on session 
Result 2 Harmdoers who face apology costs are less likely to apologize. 
                                                 
12 Goffman (1971) states that an apology contains a promise of more acceptable behaviour in the future. Since 
we have a perfect stranger matching, this definition does not apply to our environment. 
13 Apologies evolve almost exclusively after offenses. There is only one exception: When both players answered 
their questions incorrectly in the quiz games, in the baseline treatment 4% of players B apologize for their fault. 
This behavior can for example be explained by fear of punishment. A more general explanation would be that 
certain people just dislike giving wrong answers or letting the other player down, feel guilty after a failure and 
apologize.   17 
In the costly treatment messages cost 5 points. When messages are costly the frequency 
of apologies significantly decreases from 41% to 30%. 
Result 3 Harmdoers who have assignable negative intentions are less likely to apologize. 
Assignable intentions decrease the number of sent apologies significantly. In the quiz 
game offenses can be caused either intentionally or due to inability. In the no quiz game an 
offense is always caused intentionally. We find that apologies are present after only 10% of 
after intentionally committed offenses. 
Effects of apologies on punishment 
In  the  quiz  games  the  receiver  of  an  apology  faces  uncertainty.  He  cannot  be  sure 
whether the harmdoer committed the offense intentionally or due to inability. He also does 
not know whether the harmdoer sent the apology due to honest regret for the offense or in 
order to avoid punishment. We are interested in how receivers of apologetic messages react to 
this uncertainty. We also determine the benchmark for punishment after an offense without 
apology option. Doing this, we can investigate whether apologizing decreases punishment or 
whether not apologizing increases punishment. Eventually, we focus on victims reactions to 
apologies after clearly intentionally committed offenses. 
Result 4 After an offense with ambiguous intentionality apologizers are punished less often 
than offenders who remain silent. 
Figure  3  shows  the  fraction  of  players  A  willing  to  punish  harmdoers  in  the  four 
treatments with punishment option. We distinguish between punishment probability after no 
message and after an apology. First we consider the quiz game treatments with uncertain 
intentionality and message option. In baseline the punishment probability after an apology is 
17  percentage  points  lower.  In  costly  the  punishment  probability  after  an  apology  is  21 
percentage points lower. We conclude that after an offense with ambiguous intentionality 
apologizers  are  punished  less  often  than  offenders  who  remain  silent.  This  confirms 
Prediction 2. 
No  other  message  yields  the  same  effect.  We  find  that  admissions  of  regret  or 
blameworthiness  or  messages  including  other  content  do  not  have  a  significant  effect  on 
punishment. That means it is not just any message that mitigates punishment after an offense, 
but  it  has  to  be  an  apology.  We  do  not  find  that  an  apology  costs  have  an  effect  on 
punishment. Costly apologies do not seem to be not more credible than costless apologies.   18 
Table 4 (column 1) presents the results of the corresponding regressions. 
Result 5 Apologizing does not decrease punishment probability. Not apologizing increases 
punishment probability. 
We ran the additional treatment no apology option in order to determine whether an 
apology  decreases  punishment  or  whether  no  apology  increases  punishment.  52%  of 
participants punish harmdoers in the no apology option treatment.
14 We define this fraction as 
the punishment benchmark. As Table 4 (column 4) shows, the punishment probability after an 
apology does not differ significantly from this benchmark. This means apologizers are not 
punished  less  than  offenders  who  did  not  have  the  option  to  apologize.  However,  the 
punishment  probability  after  no  message  was  sent  although  an  apology  was  possible  is 
significantly higher than the benchmark. This result suggests that victims have a demand for 
apologies if they are possible. Not sending an apology despite being able to do so increases 
punishment probability compared to situations where apologies are not permitted. This partly 
confirms Prediction 3. 
Result 6 An apology affects the event of punishment but not the level of punishment.  
Until  now,  we  focused  on  punishment  probabilities.  Our  design  also  allows  us  to 
measure  the  effects  of  apologies  on  punishment  points.  Figure  4  shows  the  average  of 
punishment  points  assigned  to  player  B  by  player  A.  We  find  that  after  offenses  with 
ambiguous intentionality, apologizers (48% in baseline, 58% in costly) are punished less than 
non-apologizers (65% in baseline, 79% in costly). Table 4 (column 5) presents the results of 
the  regression.  However,  if  we  control  for  conditional  punishment  only,  the  punishment-
decreasing  effect  of  an  apology  vanishes.  If  harmdoers  apologize  after  an  offense  with 
uncertain intentionality, the probability for punishment decreases. However, if the apology 
does not prevent punishment, it will not mitigate punishment either. (See Table 4 (column 6).) 
Result  7  After  a  clearly  intentionally  committed  offense  punishment  probability  and 
punishment level after an apology are higher than after silence. 
Now we turn to the no quiz treatment where offenses are clearly intentional. 57% of 
harmed players A decide to punish when their counterpart remains silent. Offenders who 
remain silent receive 30.21 punishment points on average. After an apology, 71% are willing 
to punish. Apologizers are punished 45.43 points on average. We find that after a clearly 
                                                 
14 Since in no apology no message is possible, there is no distinction between no message and apology.    19 
intentional offense, apologizers are punished significantly more often and significantly more 
than non-apologizers. This confirms Prediction 4. 
We  find  that  punishment  and  apology  behavior  are  perfectly  aligned.  After  clearly 
intentionally committed offenses apologizers are punished more often. Harmdoers apparently 
foresee this and apologize less. After offenses with uncertain intentionality apologizers are 
punished less than non-apologizers. Harmdoers react accordingly and apologize. 
The optimal strategy for player A is to cooperate. The optimal strategy for player B in 
the quiz treatments is to answer his multiple choice question incorrectly and to apologize for 
it. In the quiz treatment player B should not cooperate and not apologize. 
Figure 4: Punishment probability after an offense with punishment option 
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6.  Conclusion 
An apology, no matter how sincere or affective, does not and cannot undo what has 
been done. And yet, in a mysterious way and according to its own logic, this is precisely what 
it manages to do. (Nicholas Tavuchis (1991)). This paper partly discloses the mysterious way 
and logic of the role of an apology. We shed light on how and when apologies work and why 
people apologize. In order to answer this question we conducted a laboratory experiment. We 
designed an experiment where people can harm others and where apologies were appropriate 
and reasonable. The great advantage of our design is that it controls for clearly intentional 
offenses and offenses that can be committed intentionally or due to inability. 
Our  results  clearly  show  that  the  effect  of  an  apology  depends  on  the  ambiguous 
intentionality of the offense. In order to make an apology work there has to be a positive 
probability that the offense has been committed unintentionally. Then the harmdoer can use 
the  apology  to  convince  the  victim  of  his  good  intentions.  If  the  offense  was  clearly 
intentional, an apology is useless. In this situation offenders do better not to apologize since 
an apology increases punishment. Apologies in this case seem to be interpreted as an affront. 
Offenders foresee this behavior and rarely apologize. 
If the intentionality behind the offense is ambiguous we find that offenses are often 
followed by apologies – in particular if the harmdoer faces possible punishment. Harmdoers 
use  apologies  mainly  in  order  to  avoid  punishment  and  not  for  reasons  of  remorse. 
Nevertheless, the harmdoers’ strategy works: After offenses with ambiguous intentionality 
victims punish apologizers less than non-apologizers. Against conventional beliefs, our results 
show that the driving force behind this difference is not the apology’s decreasing effect on 
punishment.  It  is  rather  the  refusal  to  apologize  that  increases  punishment  and  therefore 
causes the difference. A possible explanation is that victims expect an apology for the offense 
and punish if they do not receive one. 
Our results show that the costs of an apology do not affect punishment behavior and 
therefore  contradict  predictions  by  Ohtsubo  and  Watanabe  (2009)  and  Ho  (2007). C ostly 
apologies do not appear to be more credible than costless apologies.  
With respect to the functioning of apologies we find that apologizing decreases the 
probability of being punished but does not reduce the extent of punishment if punishment 
occurs. People either accept an apology and therefore stop punishing, or they do not accept 
the apology and punish nevertheless. People totally forgive or do not forgive at all. Offenses 
are not partly unintentional and therefore you cannot “forgive just a little bit”.   22 
 
Appendix-Instructions 
Instructions- Player A 
Today you are participating in an economic experiment. By reading the following instructions 
carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn money in addition to the 2 euro 
show-up  fee.  Therefore  it  is  important  to  read  the  instructions  carefully.  During  the 
experiment it is not allowed to communicate with other participants. That is why we ask you 
not  to  talk  with  each  other.  If  you  have  any  questions,  please  take  another  look  at  the 
instructions. If you still have a question, please raise your hand. We will then come to you and 
answer your question in private. During the experiment we do not use euros, but points. All 
points  you  receive  during  the  experiment  will  be  changed  into  euros  at  the  end  of  the 
experiment: 1 point =0.01 euros. The following pages give you instructions on the course of 
the experiment. At the end of the instructions you will find some control questions that will 
help you to understand the experiment. The experiment will start as soon as all participants 
are familiar with the experiment. SUMMARY: The experiment lasts 10 rounds. In every 
round you and a player B form a team. Both of you receive 2 questions. Answering these 
questions  correctly  changes  your  points.  There  are  solo  questions  and  team  questions. 
Answering a solo question correctly gives 5 points. Answering a team question correctly 
means losing 40 points and gains 120 points for the team member. First player A solves team 
question A. Next, player B solves team question B. After team question B player B can send a 
message to you. Afterwards you can deduct points from player B. Then a new period starts. In 
every period you form a team with another player B. At the end of the experiment you receive 
a  2  euro  show-up  fee  additionally  to  all  points  you  receive  during  the  experiment. 
EXPERIMENT: At the beginning of every round every player receives an endowment of 60 
points. Next, every player A is matched with a random player B. You form a team for one 
round and answer questions. There are team questions and solo questions. Team questions: 
Every team receives 2 team questions: team question A and team question B. First, player A 
answers team question A, and then player B answers team question B. Answering a team 
question correctly means losing 40 points and gaining 120 points for the team member. This 
is clarified in the next table:   23 
 
team question A  player  A  answers  team 
question A correctly 
player  A  answers  team 
question A incorrectly 
points for player 
A 
-40  0 
points for player 
B 
120  0 
It is exactly the opposite with team question B. 
team question B  player  B  answers  team 
question B correctly 
player  B  answers  team 
question B incorrectly 
points for player 
A 
120  0 
points for player 
B 
-40  0 
Solo questions: When you are answering your team question, player B receives the same 
question as a solo question. By answering his solo question correctly, he receives 5 points. 
When player B is answering his team question, you receive the same question as a solo 
question.  By  answering  your  solo  question  correctly,  you  receive  5  points.  After  every 
question  you  learn  whether  the  team  question  has  been  answered  correctly  and  your 
corresponding points. When you had to solve a solo question, you also learn if you have 
answered the solo question correctly. Total points are calculated by the initial endowment of 
60 points plus the points gained in team questions A and B. After team question B player B 
can send you a message. [Only in costly treatment: This message costs 5 points.] As soon as 
player B sent you the message, the message appears on your screen. If player B does not send 
a message, you will be informed too. [Only in punishment treatments: After receiving the 
message, you can deduct points from player B. You can deduct up to 100 points but not more 
points  than  player  B  owns.  By  deducting  points  form  player  B,  these  points  are  erased. 
Deducting 5 points cost 1 point, deducting 1 point costs 0.2 points]. Now the period is over. 
Every player A is matched with a new player B. After 10 rounds you will see a screen that 
shows your income from all periods.   24 
Instructions- Player B 
Today you are participating in an economic experiment. By reading the following instructions 
carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn money in addition to the 2 euro 
show-up  fee.  Therefore  it  is  important  to  read  the  instructions  carefully.  During  the 
experiment it is not allowed to communicate with other participants. That is why we ask you 
not  to  talk  with  each  other.  If  you  have  any  questions,  please  take  another  look  at  the 
instructions. If you still have a question, please raise your hand. We will then come to you and 
answer your question in private. During the experiment we do not use euros, but points. All 
points  you  receive  during  the  experiment  will  be  changed  into  euros  at  the  end  of  the 
experiment: 1 point =0.01 euros. The following pages give you instructions on the course of 
the experiment. At the end of the instructions you find some control questions that will help 
you to understand the experiment. The experiment will start as soon as all participants are 
familiar with the experiment. SUMMARY: The experiment lasts 10 rounds. In every round 
you and a player A form a team. Both of you receive 2 questions. Answering these questions 
correctly changes your points. There are solo questions and team questions. Answering a solo 
question correctly means 5 points. Answering a team question correctly means losing 40 
points and gaining 120 points for the team member. First player A solves team question A. 
Next, player B solves team question B. After team question B player B can send a message to 
you. Afterwards you can deduct points from player B. Then a new period starts. In every 
period you form a team with another player B. At the end of the experiment you receive a 2 
euro  show-up  fee  additionally  to  all  points  you  receive  during  the  experiment. 
EXPERIMENT: At the beginning of every round every player receives an endowment of 60 
points. Next, every player A is matched with a random player B. You form a team for one 
round and answer questions. There are team questions and solo questions. Team questions: 
Every team receives 2 team questions: team question A and team question B. First, player A 
answers team question A, and then player B answers team question B. Answering a team 
question correctly means losing 40 points and gaining 120 points for the team member. This 
is clarified in the next table: 
team question A  player A answers team 
question A correctly 
player A answers team 
question A incorrectly 
points for player A  -40  0 
points for player B  120  0 
   25 
It is exactly the opposite with team question B. 
team question B  player B answers team 
question Bcorrectly 
player B answers team 
question Bincorrectly 
points for player A  120  0 
points for player B  -40  0 
Solo questions: When you are answering your team question, player B receives the same 
question as a solo question. By answering his solo question correctly, he receives 5 points. 
When player B is answering his team question, you receive the same question as a solo 
question.  By  answering  your  solo  question  correctly,  you  receive  5  points.  After  every 
question you learn if the team question has been answered correctly and your corresponding 
points. When you had to solve a solo question, you also learn if you have answered the solo 
question correctly. After team question B you can send a message to player A. [Only in costly 
treatment: This message costs 5 points.] [Only in punishment treatments: After receiving the 
message, player A can deduct points from you. He can deduct up to 100 points but not more 
points  than  you  own.  Deducting  points  from  you  means  that  these  points  are  erased. 
Deducting 5 points cost 1 point, deducting 1 point costs 0.2 points.] Now the period is over. 
Every player A is matched with a new player B. After 10 rounds you will see a screen that 
shows your income from all periods.   26 
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